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Abstract
Nowadays, Bitcoin and Proof-of-Work blockchain systems are becom-
ing prominent and incorporated in many applications and multi-agent
systems. Despite their wide applications, the security of such systems is
not entirely guaranteed even if half of the total hash rate is held by non-
malicious miners. Particularly, Selfish mining strategy [2] which could
disrupt the economy of Bitcoin mining has not been studied in the con-
text of multiple miners. Our empirical investigation extends the original
study by accounting for multiple Selfish miners (who always use Self-
ish mining strategy) and multiple strategic miners (who choose a mining
strategy to maximise their individual mining reward.) We show that the
number of miners in the system is as important as the distribution of hash
rate among miners and Selfish mining can be prevented in the presence
of multiple miners.
1 Introduction
Blockchain is used to securely record a ledger of Bitcoin transactions amongst
Internet users [1]. The great success of Bitcoin and Blockchain is based on an
application of a cryptographic puzzle, namely Proof-of-Work, and the economic
incentive for miners who are the underlying workforce of Bitcoin system. Clearly,
it is important to recompensate every miner in proportion to their individual
computational effort in order to sustain the system and its cryptocurrency.
Due to Nakamoto’s analysis, it has been widely believed that Bitcoin and
similar systems will remain secure and sustainable as long as at least a half
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of the total hash rate in the system is held by non-malicious miners [1]. Such
miners who always follow the protocol to create new blocks will prevent a forking
attack, where a part of a blockchain is overwritten by malicious miner’s blocks.
However, Selfish mining (SM) strategy allows a malicious miner who pos-
sesses at least one-third of the total hash rate to successfully fork the blockchain
[2]. Essentially, SM strategy uses an information hiding technique to periodi-
cally gain an advantage over the other miners. With a larger amount of hash
rate, SM strategy will become even more effective and fork the blockchain more
frequently. As a consequence, an SM miner receives their mining reward higher
than they should, and other miners will receive lower reward in turn. In the
worst scenario, the mining economy will collapse due to the disrupted distribu-
tion of mining reward.
Despite such a threat, there is yet no research on the SM strategy simultane-
ously used by multiple miners. To the best of our knowledge, most investigations
so far focused on a system with one malicious miner using SM strategy and the
others mining according to the protocol [2, 4, 3, 6, 5]. In practice, multiple
miners in Bitcoin system could use SM strategy at the same time. Whether SM
strategy is even more effective in such situation is yet unknown.
For this reason, we carried out an empirical investigation on SM strategy in
the context of multiple miners. Particularly, we seek to know (a) the amount of
hash rate that SM strategy requires to frequently fork the blockchain and earn
mining rewards more than it should, and (b) the amount of hash rate that non-
malicious miners require to prevent SM strategy. This knowledge is important
for Bitcoin community and developers of Blockchain systems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Firstly, a literature review
related to our study is presented. We then describe our models of Bitcoin
system and relevant concepts for our work. Subsequently, our empirical results
are described and discussed. We finally conclude this paper with our findings
and future work.
2 Related Work
After Eyal and Sirer’s seminal work [2], a number of studies have advanced the
research of SM strategy. For an example, some studies proposed an optimised
variant of SM strategy [3, 6]. Moreover, a combination of SM strategy with other
attacks was studied [6]. As a consequence, the amount of hash rate required by
SM strategy became even less than 13 of the total hash rate in the system.
Despite many improvements of Bitcoin protocol proposed to prevent against
the SM strategy, their methods are difficult to carry out in practice [5]. In
particular, the improved protocols raise the amount of hash rate that SM strat-
egy requires up to certain degree. However, they require a precise coordination
among Bitcoin community to adopt the improved protocol at the same time.
To the best of our knowledge, the idea of multiple miners simultaneously
employing SM strategy is not explored in the existing literature. In particular,
current work so far only studied SM or similar strategies under a system of one
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malicious miner and one non-malicious miner [2, 3, 6, 5]. Since there are many
miners in the practical systems, it is important to investigate how SM strategy
will perform in a context of multiple miners that might individually employ SM
strategy.
3 Models of the Bitcoin System
In this section, we formally define two models of Bitcoin system where the
difference between them is a miner’s capability of choosing a mining strategy.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the system has:
1. A fully connected network of Bitcoin miners without communication delay,
2. An equal amount of Bitcoin reward to the creator of the block for every
block in the blockchain, and
3. The same computational difficulty (the target hash value) for every block
in the blockchain.
These assumptions are important for us to focus on our aim of the investigation.
We consider two mining strategies: namely Honest mining (HM) and Self-
ish mining (SM). The HM strategy corresponds to the Bitcoin mining protocol
where a miner always mines a new block from the last block of the longest
blockchain. On the other hand, the SM strategy is one that strategically hides
and publishes its new block in order to privately mine the block by themselves
and overwrites other miners’ blocks [2]. An algorithm of Selfish mining is pre-
sented in Algorithm 1.
Consequently there are three types of miners: Honest miner, Selfish miner,
and Strategic miner. Honest miner and Selfish miner use HM and SM respec-
tively; henceforth HM and SM will also be used to denote them. In contrast,
Strategic miner (StrM) is a miner that chooses a strategy, either HM or SM
strategy, to maximise their mining reward. StrM will be referred later in the
second model where we consider the miner is capable of choosing their strategy.
3.1 Fixed Strategy Mining Model
We modeled the Bitcoin mining process where every miner employs a fixed
mining strategy as a Markov process M = (I, C, P, S,P (·) ,U (·)).
• I = {1, 2, ..., N} is the collection of all miners denoted by numbers.
• C = (ci|ci ∈ {HM, SM} , i ∈ I) is a list of miner’s mining strategies where
its i-th element is a mining strategy used by i-th miner in I.
• P =
(
pi|pi ∈ [0, 1] ,
∑
i∈I pi = 1, i ∈ I
)
is a tuple of miner’s mining powers
where its i-th element is an amount of mining power of i-th miner in I. In
other words, P is a power allocation of the system and each mining power
pi ∈ P represents a proportion of the miner’s hash rate in the Bitcoin
system.
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Algorithm 1 Selfish mining [Eyal and Sirer, 2014]
Initialise:
public chain ← all publicly known blocks
private chain ← all publicly known blocks
privateBranchLen← 0
Mine from the tail block of the private chain
Upon any new block:
if the new block was created by the selfish miner then
∆← length(private chain) - length(public chain)
Append the block to private chain
privateBranchLen← privateBranchLen+ 1
if ∆ = 0 and privateBranchLen = 2 then
publish all of the private chain
privateBranchLen← 0
Mine from the new tail of the private chain
else
∆← length(private chain) - length(public chain)
Append the new block to public chain
if ∆ = 0 then
private chain ← public chain
privateBranchLen← 0
else if ∆ = 1 then
publish last block of private chain
else if ∆ = 2 then
publish all of the private chain
privateBranchLen← 0
else
Publish the 1st unpublished block in private chain
Mine from the tail of the private chain
• S is a set of all states in the Markov process where its element s ∈ S is
a state of blockchain. Note that the initial state s0 ∈ S represents the
blockchain with only the 1st block.
• P (·) is a state transition probability mass function where P (st+1|st) = pi,
and the next state st+1 is simply the current state st but includes the new
block created by miner i. In other words, a transition from st to st+1
represents a miner’s discovery of a new block.
• U (·) is a utility function U : I × S 7→ [0, 1] that computes a proportion
of miner’s blocks in the longest blockchain. In other words, the value of
U (s, i) is i-th miner’s mining reward given a state of the blockchain s ∈ S.
U (s, i) =
bi∑
i∈I bi
(1)
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where bi is a total amount of i-th miner’s blocks in the longest blockchain
s. Intuitively, U (s, i) will converge given a sufficiently large time in this
Markov model.
3.2 Dynamic Strategy Mining Model
We modeled the Bitcoin mining where every miner except the HM individually
chooses their mining strategy to maximise their individual mining reward as an
empirical normal-form game. With the game theoretical analysis, we account
for a change of SM’s mining strategy when they deem it is better off to use HM
under some power allocations. Specifically, we extended the previous model such
that SM becomes StrM who decides on their mining strategy given a perfect
information of the other miners’ strategies and all possible mining rewards that
the StrM receives.
Formally, an empirical normal-form game of mining process is denoted by
G = {I, C′, P,A (·) ,U′ (·)} where I and P are the same as those in the previous
model and the others are described as follows.
• C′ = (c′i|c
′
i ∈ {HM, StrM} , i ∈ I) is a list of miner’s types where its i-th
element indicate whether an i-th miner in I is Honest miner or Strategic
miner.
• A (·) is a function that maps a type of miner to a valid set of strategies.
A (c′i) =
{
{HM, SM} if c′i = StrM
{HM} if c′i = HM
(2)
A strategy profile is simply denoted asA = (ai, a−i) = (ai|ai ∈ A (ci) , c
′
i ∈ C, i ∈ I)
where a−i collectively denotes strategies of all miners except for i-th miner.
• U′ (·) is a payoff function U′ : I × AN 7→ [0, 1] that computes a miner’s
mining reward. Given a strategy profile A, the value of U′ (i, A) is simply
retrieved from U ∈ M with similar elements and C ∈ M corresponding
to A.
4 Power Threshold, Safety Level and Equilib-
rium
As mentioned in Section 1, we are interested in the mining power that a SM/StrM
requires to earn an unfairly large amount of mining reward and the mining power
that a collective of all HM requires to prevent such unfair earnings.
In details, an unfairly large mining reward in our models is one that exceeds
the mining power that a miner possesses. Originally, a system in the long
run where everyone is HM will allocate each miner a mining reward equal to
their mining power (since there is only one block generated at each period and
everyone mines from the latest block.) However, a miner with sufficiently high
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mining power can use SM and gain their mining reward higher than their mining
power.
In our result analysis and discussion, we will look for a power threshold which
is the least mining power that allows a SM/StrM to always earn their unfairly
large mining reward independently of how much mining power the others pos-
sess.
Definition 1 Given Pˆ (p) the set of all possible power allocations with any
HM/StrM having mining power p, and Up,P the mining reward of any SM/StrM
miner with mining power p in a power allocation P , a power threshold β is
one that satisfies the condition below.
β = min
p∈[0,1]
{ p | ∀P ∈ Pˆ (p) : Up,P > p ;
∀q ∈ [p, 1] , ∀P ∗ ∈ Pˆ (q) : Uq,P∗ > q }
Similarly, we also look for a safety level which is the least mining power of a
collective of all HM that prevents all SM/StrM from earning their unfairly large
mining reward. Once the safety level is reached, no SM/StrM will be able to
gain mining reward more than they should.
Definition 2 Given I ′ the set of all SM/StrM miners and Ui,pi the mining
reward of an i-th miner with mining power pi, a safety level γ is one that
satisfies the condition below.
γ = min
pHM∈[0,1]
{pHM |
∀P ∈ Pˆ (pHM) , ∀i ∈ I
′ (P ) : Ui,P ≤ pi,P ;
∀qHM ∈ [pHM, 1] , ∀P
∗ ∈ Pˆ (qHM) ,
∀i′ ∈ I ′ (P ∗) : Ui′,P∗ ≤ pi′,P∗ }
where pHM is a mining power of the Honest miner.
In the dynamic strategy mining model (Section 3.2), we will retrieve an
outcome of the game prior to an analysis of the safety level and the power
threshold. In particular, we will use the concept of pure-strategy ǫ-equilibrium
(PSNE) to derive miner’s strategy choice that maximises their mining reward.
The concept is also useful to disregard a small fluctuation in the payoff value;
such a fluctuation is caused by a randomness element in the mining process and
consequently could make us misinterpret the result.
Definition 3 A pure-strategy ǫ-Nash equilibrium (PSNE) where ǫ > 0 is a
strategy profile A∗ = (a∗i , a−i) that satisfies the following condition:
∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ A (c
′
i) U
′ (i, A∗) ≥ U′ (i, (ai, a−i)) + ǫ
Finally, an extra assumption where HM is more preferable to SM will be
incorporated in the PSNE analysis of the result. In the next section, we will
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Parameter Value
Power step
for 1,2,3 SM/StrM 0.01
for 4 SM/StrM 0.02
for 5,6,7 SM/StrM 0.04
for 8,9 SM/StrM 0.05
ǫ 0.0001
Table 1: Parameters of the simulation
show the existence of multiple PSNE due to a negligible difference between HM’s
and SM’s mining reward in the same setting. Since there is neither an incentive
nor a proper reason for the StrM to choose SM instead of HM in such cases, we
will disregard such equilibria with SM by the HM-preference assumption, which
is defined as follows.
Definition 4 Given a pair of PSNE A∗ = (a∗i , a−i) and A
∗∗ = (a∗∗i , a−i) where
a∗i 6= a
∗∗
i , an HM-preferable ǫ-equilibrium is the equilibrium in which i-th miner
choice is HM.
5 Empirical Results and Discussion
To address our research question, we carried out discrete event simulations of
the models with different parameters such that different numbers of SM/StrM
in the system and different power allocations are accounted. Each simulation
parameter was also repeated 100 times to compute an average utility value after
convergence. In the case of non-convergence, we used the value after 200,000
timesteps which is analogous to 3-4 years in the Bitcoin system. Note that there
can be multiple events (e.g. a number of broadcasts by multiple SM) in each
simulation timestep. Unless specified otherwise, each event was sequentially
processed in a uniformly random manner.
Due to the very large number of simulations required, we carried out sim-
ulations only for the base settings and performed permutation to cover all re-
sults. For example, we used the converged utility values of the model M1 with
C1 = (HM, SM) and P1 = (0.4, 0.6) for the model M2 where C2 = (SM,HM)
and P2 = (0.6, 0.4). We also treated a collective of HM as one HM in our simu-
lation since we do not refer to their individual earning and an overall outcome
of their individual mining in our models is the same as a mining done by one
HM with their combined mining powers.
5.1 Fixed Strategy Mining
In general, the mining power of SM and HM that yields an unfairly large mining
reward decreases with the number of SM in the system. As shown in Figure
7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
M
ea
n 
of
 S
M
's 
m
in
in
g 
re
w
ar
d
am
on
g 
po
w
er
 a
llo
ca
tio
ns
SM's mining power
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
M
ea
n 
of
 H
M
's 
m
in
in
g 
re
w
ar
d
am
on
g 
po
w
er
 a
llo
ca
tio
ns
HM's mining power
(b)
          
     1         2         3        4         5         6         7         8        9       SM 
Figure 1: An average among different power allocations of the SM’s mining reward
(a) and the HM’s mining reward (b) in a system with different numbers of SM. The
numerical prefix of SM indicates the number of SM. The error bars are the standard
error of the mean.
1(a), the mean of SM’s mining reward among different power allocations ex-
ponentially grows in an increase of SM’s mining power until its convergence at
unity. However, the range of SM’s mining power during the exponential growth
gradually decreases with the number of SM. Similar trend of the HM’s mining
reward with respect to the HM’s mining power is observed and shown in Figure
1(b) as well. Note that HM can earn an unfairly large mining reward in some
cases too.
Further examination of the results showed an underlying cause of the trends
of HM/SM’s mining rewards. Generally, the higher the number of miners, the
less mining power each of them has. With low mining power, SM is less likely
to create a private chain longer than the other chain and therefore most of
their computational resources are wasted. Therefore, the significant amount of
mining power that a SM or HM requires to earn an unfairly large mining reward
become less in a large number of miners in the system.
Surprisingly, a number of SMs can simultaneously get their unfairly large
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mining reward under some power allocations. In particular, their mining power
in the power allocation are nearly the same mining power and larger than certain
value. The range of such mining power also decreases in an increase of the
number of SM. Due to space limitation, we cannot visually show the range of
the mining power.
5.2 Dynamic Strategy Mining
We first noticed multiple PSNE for some particular power allocations and one
PSNE for every power allocation in every number of StrM in the system. As
shown in Figure 2(a), the average number of PSNE per power allocation is
always at least one. However it becomes extremely large in power allocations
with a StrM whose mining power is relatively high.
Further observation showed that the large number of PSNE is caused by a
StrM with low mining power in power allocations where there is another StrM
whose mining power is superlatively high. In such power allocations, there is
no significant difference of mining reward between HM and SM strategy used
by StrM with low mining power; which results in a slightly moderate amount of
StrM’s SM over all PSNE as depicted in Figure 2(c). Consequently, the number
of PSNE will simply be a combinatorial number of the StrM’s HM/SM with
low mining power and therefore grows in an increase of the number of StrM as
shown in Figure 2(a).
With the HM-preference assumption (Definition 3), a reasonable choice of
StrM’s strategy in PSNE was obtained. In particular, StrM will no longer
choose SM strategy if there is no significant difference between HM’s and SM’s
mining reward under the same strategy profile and the same power allocation.
The change of strategy in PSNE is clearly demonstrated by a comparatively
low average number of PSNE per power allocation in Figure 2(b) and no SM
strategy chosen by StrM with mining power under 0.3 in Figure 2(d).
Intuitively, a StrM is more likely to choose SM strategy as their mining
power increases to enjoy an unfairly large mining reward. This speculation is
confirmed in Figures 2(d) and 3(a). That is, a StrM whose mining power is
no larger than 0.25 always chooses HM for any number of StrM. The mining
reward of such StrM converges toward the same value of their mining power as
the number of StrM in the system increases. However, a StrM will choose SM
strategy and earns all mining reward once they possesses at least a half of the
total mining power.
Interestingly, the more StrM in the system, the more the StrM’s choice of
mining strategy and their mining reward becomes similar to the case of single
StrM. As demonstrated in Figure 2(d), when the number of StrM increases, the
transition of the StrM’s strategy from HM to SM gradually becomes sharper
similarly to the case of a single StrM. Likewise, Figure 3(a) shows a convergence
of the mining reward of the StrM whose mining power lower than a half to one
of the case of single StrM.
In contrast, the HM’s mining reward does not converge to one in the case
of a single StrM, but it converges to their mining power as the number of StrM
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increases. This is depicted in Figure 3(b), where the HM’s mining reward of
HM’s mining power under 0.67 becomes more correspondent to the mining power
with an increase of the number of StrM in the system.
Even with the HM-preference assumption, there also are multiple PSNE for
some particular power allocations. Such multiple PSNE are shown in Figure
2(b) where an average number of PSNE per power allocation is more than unity
for the StrM’s mining power ranging up to 0.36. Our observation found out
that multiple StrM with nearly the same mining power larger than 0.3 together
choose either HM or SM in such PSNE. In such PSNE, an individual deviation
from HM to SM or vice versa yields a comparatively low mining reward for the
deviating StrM. Therefore, a PSNE with such StrM together choosing HM or
SM are formed.
With further inspection, the existence of multiple SM chosen by StrM in
such PSNE becomes more limited and less likely to occur as the number of
StrM increases. Comparing to the fixed strategy model’s, the range of mining
power of multiple SM in this model is even lesser. Due to space limitation, we
cannot visually show the range of the mining power under this model.
5.3 Safety Level and Power Threshold
As shown in Figure 4, HM requires less mining power to prevent SM/StrM from
earning their unfairly large mining reward when the number of SM/StrM in the
system grows. The underlying explanation of the monotonic decrease of safety
level against SM/StrM is as follows.
1. As discussed in Section 5.1, SM with low mining power frequently wastes
their effort on their private chain which is unlikely to be longer than the
other chains. Consequently, the safety level against SM, or the mining
power required by HM to prevent SM, becomes lower with an increase of
the number of SM.
2. Since StrM with low mining power choose HM (Section 5.2), the combined
power of miners who use HM strategy in the system becomes larger and
consequently the HM miner requires less mining power. With an increase
of the number of StrM in the system, the number of StrM with low mining
power who will choose HM will also increase and the safety level against
StrM will further decrease.
Moreover, the safety level against SM/StrM is bounded by one in the case
of 1 SM/StrM; that is, it is no greater than 0.67. Intuitively, the case of 1
SM/StrM can be considered as the most difficult for HM to prevent since it is a
coalition of all SM/StrM combining their mining power and working together.
The safety level in this scenario is therefore the highest one in all cases of number
of SM/StrM.
Similarly, the least mining power required by SM/StrM to earn an unfairly
large mining reward become lesser in an increase of the number of SM/StrM.
In particular, Figure 4 shows the monotonic decrease of the power threshold of
10
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Figure 2: Average number of PSNE per power allocation (a)(b) and overall StrM’s
strategy in PSNE (c)(d) with different number of StrM in the system. Both (b) and
(d) on the right are results with the HM-preference assumption, and vice versa for
both (a) and (c) on the left. Values after StrM’s mining power 0.6 in all graphs do
not change and therefore truncated.
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Figure 3: An average among different PSNE of the StrM’s mining reward (a) and
HM’s mining reward (b) in a system with different numbers of StrM. The numerical
prefix of StrM indicates the number of StrM. Note the error bars in are the standard
error of the mean.
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Figure 4: Power thresholds of SM/StrM and safety levels against SM/StrM with re-
spect to different numbers of SM/StrM in the system. No difference of a safety level
between one with the HM-preference assumption and one without the assumption is
found.
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SM/StrM after the case of single SM/StrM. The explanation is similar to above
and goes as follows.
1. A group of SM in the system will possess less mining power if the number
of SM increases. Since SM with low mining frequently waste their effort by
trying to create a private chain that is unlikely to be long enough (Section
5.1), the least amount of mining power to frequently create a private chain
longer than the others will become lower.
2. In a similar manner, the mining power of many StrM will decrease as the
number of StrM in the system increases. Since StrM with low mining
power choose HM (Section 5.2), the system dynamic is analogous to a
system with 1 StrM. Although Figure 3(a) directly confirms our analysis,
Figure 3(b) does not since it does not take account of StrM that use HM.
As shown in Figure 4, an upper bound of the power threshold of SM/StrM can
be found from the case of 2 or 3 SM/StrM; that is, a half of the total mining
power. The underlying explanation is intuitive; we consider a system with
two SM/StrM who hold most of the total mining power and the rest including
HM holds a negligible amount of mining power. In such a case, it is mainly a
competition between the two SM/StrM to create the longest private chain, and
a SM/StrM needs approximately half of the total mining power to win.
6 Conclusion
In this work, an empirical investigation of Selfish mining (SM) strategy employed
by multiple miners has been carried out. Since our models accounted for multiple
miners, we are able to identify a case of multiple malicious miners using SM
strategy and simultaneously earn their unfairly large amount of mining reward.
As the number of malicious miners in the system increases, the SM strategy
will become even more effective and require less mining power to obtain their
mining reward more than they should. Our result indicated that the amount
of mining power required to get such earnings will decrease even further than
one-third as previously reported by [2].
However, the SM strategy is comparably ineffective and less employed in
the presence of a large number of strategic miners who choose to use either the
Bitcoin mining protocol or the SM strategy to maximise their mining reward.
Given that the distribution of mining power in Bitcoin system is publicly known,
strategic miners whose mining power is not large will follow the mining protocol.
Surprisingly, non-malicious miners in a system with a large number of miners
are not required to hold a large amount of mining power to prevent SM strategy.
We have shown that such amount of mining power is lesser than two-third which
was previously identified [2]. Therefore, it is important to have a large number
of miners in the system to prevent malicious mining strategies such as SM.
A number of interesting questions remain to be further investigated. As
pointed out by [2], a network capability of the SM miner is also an important
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factor that affects how much this strategy could be effective. This aspect will
be taken into account in our future work. Moreover, an optimal SM strategy
with respect to multiple selfish miners, similar to one in [3], is yet not known.
With the optimal strategy, it remains to be seen whether our findings are still
valid.
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